What Computers Can’t Do Yet– viz., AI
Thursday, August 28th, 2003Today has been a productive day, even though I haven’t done half of what I wanted to do, at least in terms of school work. I actually went to the trouble to leave school in the middle of the day, to go and locate the post office downtown, at the peril of not being able to find a parking space when I got back. And I pulled it off: I located the post office, and I even found a parking space when I got back. In the process of locating that parking space, I visited a portion of the UH campus that I’ve never been in before, the entire two+ years I’ve been here.
“What Computers Still Can’t Do” by Hubert Dreyfus is a pretty famous book, if I recall correctly. That is, I’ve heard of it at least a few times; being a bystander in the world of famous books, if I’ve heard of it, then it must be famous. As I was leaving a professor’s office today, I saw a stack of photocopies of a part of it next to another professor’s door. Interpreting that as a signal that it was ok to take one, I did. And I found this excellent excerpt:
If it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be deferred and different, because the immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal … It is all a question of style, which means in this case timing and choice of occasion, for the same act — giving, giving in return, offering one’s services, paying a visit, etc. — can have completely different meanings at different times.
To avoid misleading anyone, that is a quote that is used in the book, not written by the author. The book itself is ‘a critique of artificial reason’, which attacks artificial intelligence. But I like that quote, because it exposes a normally ineluctable rule, without trivializing it or making it appear to have more significance than it has. It acknowledges the arbitrarity of social rules without attacking it.
Here’s another good quote:
The difference between the mathematical mind (esprit de geometrie) and the perceptive mind (esprit de finesse): the reason that mathematicians are not perceptive is that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in matters of perception where the principles do not allow for such arrangement… These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics; because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at a glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree … Mathematicians wish to treat matters of perception mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous … the mind … does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules.
Interesting, but not something I would necessarily agree with. It depends on what he is talking about; I suspect, that if he wasn’t talking directly about religion, that is the kind of reasoning he would have used to justify his religious beliefs (fanaticism). It seems like Dreyfus inserted those ellipses in choice locations to turn Pascal’s argument to his own use, in arguing that artificial reasoning research is a “degenerating research program”– a term coined by Imre Lakatos, signifying a “scientific enterprise that starts out with great promise, offering a new approach that leads to impressive results in a limited domain … inevitably researchers will want to try to apply the approach more broadly … if, however, researchers start encountering unexpected but important phenomena that consistently resist the new techniques, the program will stagnate, and researchers will abandon it as soon as a progressive alternative approach becomes available.” I agree with that interpretation of Pascal’s work– there are some things that can’t be (yet?) analyzed sufficiently accurately in terms of mathematics, can’t be reduced to mathematical models– particularly, human intelligence, and hence, AI will fail.
Of course, the question is raised, what is human intelligence. I haven’t a clue, but every algorithm I have ever seen that uses a computer to simulate a function that one would admit could best be done by a human– vectorizing bitmaps, for instance, or edge detecting– is nothing but a collection of finely tuned heuristics. And a lot are, even worse, probabilistic. Admittedly, none of these algorithms are touted as examples of AI, but if that is the best level to which we can reproduce these low level functions of human beings, how can we hope to emulate intelligence?
